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Abstract
Cherán is an indigenous town in Mexico that followed a political system established by the 
Federal Constitution until 2011 when the negligence of the Mexican State to protect the town 
from organised crime led to a self-defence movement that expelled criminals and overthrew the 
local government structure. The movement achieved a milestone when the community achieved 
self-determination through a federal court ruling. The recognition of self-determination was just 
the beginning of the real challenge to implement a cultural and political project. Fieldwork was 
conducted in Cherán that utilised ethnographic research and interviews as methods to explore 
the function of the town’s governance. The findings showed that two crucial elements support the 
Cherán’s democracy and exercise of self-determination. First is organised distrust, in which any 
citizen could serve a watchdog function to exact accountability in the governance structure. This 
distrust prevents the concentration of power to a few elites and shares power to the citizens. Second 
is Cheran’s identity as an indigenous community, which is not limited to self-identification as a 
group with a set of values and beliefs, but also a valuable device to keep self-determination alive. 
Through the combination of three key concepts, namely, self-determination, organised distrust, and 




　　　On April 15, 2011, San Francisco Cherán, an indigenous town of the Purépecha group in 
the Mexican state of Michoacán, took up arms to defend their territory. The uprising was against 
organised criminal groups involved in illegal logging and extortion in the region. At least from 2008, 
mafia infiltrated the municipal government, including its police forces (Gasparello, 2018). Those 
who tried to resist faced the threat of extortions, homicides, and levantones  (forced disappearance). 
The failure of the Mexican State to uphold the rule of law, either because of negligence or collusion, 
shows how pervasive the problem of security is in Mexico.
　　　Some inhabitants demanded the intervention of the federal and state governments, but 
these demands fell on deaf ears. At the dawn of April 15, the Cherán uprising broke out. A group 
of women blocked the loggers’ trucks route on a road that goes down from the forest to one of the 
main streets. Some of the workers were taken as hostages, while the trucks were set on fire. The 
bells of the local church, El Calvario tolled and a coheton  (rocket fire used in festivities) exploded 
in the sky to alert the community that an uprising was ongoing (Nájar, 2012; Pressly, 2016). A self-
defence movement started which eventually turned into a political and legal struggle against the 
state. On November 2, 2011, Cherán won a lawsuit before the Federal Electoral Court, and its right 
to self-determination was recognised.
　　　The original purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between trust and 
distrust in the society of Cherán. The armed movement required a certain social cohesion and 
trust within the community before they faced the armed groups while the Mexican State remained 
uninvolved. The original premise was, on the one hand, that the in-group trust was rebuilt or 
enhanced after the movement. On the other hand, distrust towards the outside (Mexican State) 
increased, which could be dangerous due to tribalism, radicalism, or dogmatism. The idea 
was grounded in the fact that Cherán demanded its self-determination right as an indigenous 
community. Previous research already asserted that distrust was not harmful when it was used 
for achieving social, economic or political goals (Horsburgh, 1961; Wicks, et al. 1999; Clark & Lee, 
2001; Larson, 2004;, Molina-Morales, et al. 2011; Van de Walle & Six, 2014; Krishnamurthy, 2015). 
If distrust has a positive social function in specific contexts, there is the possibility to envisage trust 
and distrust as two independent means that interact and negotiate. In short, the possibility of a 
new cooperation between Cherán and the external authorities and groups was expected. In the case 
of Cherán, distrust could be conceptualised as a way of resistance towards the outside.
　　　In order to study the current state of Cherán, one of the authors conducted fieldwork from 
January 24 to March 2, 2019. The methods applied were interviews and ethnographic research, 
to examine the narratives and everyday practices concerning governance and decision-making. As 
expected, social cohesion and trust within the community was confirmed. However, other elements 
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attracted attention. Cherán was cautious with outsiders such as the researcher himself. For our 
research permission, the researcher had to submit a work plan, professional background, university 
affiliation, home address, and make a brief presentation to the authorities. The reason, they said, 
was because they wanted to be sure that we had academic purposes only. Once the authorisation 
was granted, most people showed openness to the research and cooperated.
　　　The fieldwork revealed three fundamental concepts which sustain the democracy of 
Cherán. First is distrust. Cherán, like any other municipality, keeps constant communication 
with authorities and institutions from municipal, state and federal levels. Therefore, there was 
cooperation between the community and outside institutions. However, by paying attention to the 
municipal assemblies, it became apparent that distrust within, rather than outside, was one of the 
main features of the community. This distrust did not divide the citizens but engaged them into 
a democracy different from the electoral one. We call this practice “organised distrust,” which is 
indebted to the concept of counter-democracy coined by Rosanvallon (2012). It is a distrust that 
suspects power within the community. The community conducts watchdog activities to ensure 
control by the people themselves. This concept will be elaborated extensively in Section 4.
　　　The second is self-determination, which is closely linked to distrust. Cherán people assert 
their indigenous self-determination not only by choosing the economic, cultural, and political paths 
best suited for them through proposal formulation, but also by practising organised distrust.
　　　The third is the identity. The assemblies were spaces to discuss ideas, exercise organised 
distrust, and express the self-affirmation and self-enrollment as Purépecha and Cherán peoples. 
Since the principal argument used by the federal court to acknowledge Cherán’s self-determination 
was its indigenous identity, the community must maintain this identity.
　　　The purpose of this paper is to clarify how Cherán operationalised its democracy based on the 
findings in the field. We will theoretically examine the integrated function of organised distrust, 
self-determination, and identity. In our view, Cherán provides a model of an alternative democracy 
that arguably goes beyond the scope of Rosanvallon’s counter-democracy, which fails to consider 
horizontal power relationships.
　　　The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section will briefly review the legal history 
of self-determination in Mexico. The third section describes the process of Cherán’s struggle up to 
the recognition of its right to self-determination by the court. In Section 4, the relevant concepts 
on trust and democracy are analyzed. Section 5 presents the detailed findings from the fieldwork 
and analyses democracy in Cherán. Section 6 reflects on the practice of democracy in Cherán and 
concludes the article.
－ 36 －
2. Constitutional Amendments and Rights of Indigenous Groups in Mexico
　　　To understand the Federal Electoral Court’s decision on the case of Cherán, we need to review 
the legal history of constitutional amendments in Mexico, specifically, amendments introduced 
in 1992, 2001 and 2011. Seventy-five years after the 1917 Constitution, 171 years after the 
independence of Mexico, and almost 500 years after the Spanish Conquista, the Mexican state 
acknowledged the existence of indigenous peoples through the constitutional amendments of 1992. 
Article 4 declared Mexico as a pluricultural nation based on indigenous peoples, and that the law 
would “protect and promote their languages, culture, customs, resources and specific forms of 
social organisation, and will guarantee their members the effective access to the jurisdiction of the 
State” (DOF, 1992). The state was obliged to consider the indigenous traditions regarding legal 
proceedings on land litigation. However, the provision of Article 4 did not define what indigenous 
peoples were. Furthermore, the state was careful in avoiding any recognition of indigenous 
jurisdiction, effectively allowing the state apparatus resolve any internal conflict.
　　　In 2001, the state finally acknowledged the indigenous self-determination in Article 2 of 
the constitution. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (in Spanish, Ejército Zapatista 
de Liberación Nacional, EZLN),1 indigenous organisations, and some scholars criticised the 
amendments as false self-determination. First, there was no consultation with indigenous 
organisations for the amendment. Second, the federal states kept the power to decide whether to 
recognise the existence of indigenous groups or not. This setup weakened the autonomy and self-
determination of indigenous organisations because external economic interests could influence 
their status. Third, the recognition of autonomy and self-determination provided for in Article 2 
did not meet the procedure established by the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (C169), 
particularly concerning the right to prior consultation. Fourth, the indigenous groups were deemed 
as tenants rather than owners of their territory in areas where exploitable natural resources were 
present (Alcántara, 2002). 
　　　The constitutional amendments in 2011 were arguably the most significant in Mexican 
history. Under the previous constitutions, individual rights to protect property, personal 
safeguarding, and different kinds of freedom were the priority. The only social rights recognised 
1 Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) raised arms on January 1, 1994, in the southern State 
of Chiapas, against the Mexican State. It is a militia and political movement composed of indigenous groups 
whose spokesman, Subcomandante Marcos became a symbol of resistance. The EZLN denounced the precarious 
conditions that indigenous peoples had suffered for centuries in Mexico. In the first twelve days, there was 
armed combat between the EZLN and the Mexican army. The world media coverage forced the government 
to stop the attack. However, in the following two decades, the EZLN and affiliate communities suffered the 
harassment of paramilitary groups and economic pressures. The movement demanded the recognition of 
indigenous peoples and their full self-determination. The EZLN urged the Mexican state to make constitutional 
amendments in 1994 and 2001. Currently, the EZLN keeps active in Chiapas and has inspired indigenous 
groups like Cherán.
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were those inherited from the revolution, which only benefitted specific segments of society, such 
as campesinos  (peasant farmers) and trade unions. Since June 2011, broader economic, social, and 
cultural rights appeared in the Mexican legal system for which the three government branches 
of all levels bore responsibility. It is essential to discuss the provision of Article 1 of the Federal 
Constitution for this paper. As García Castillo (2015) analysed, there were four main developments 
introduced in the article. First, the incorporation into domestic law of international human rights 
treaties signed and ratified by Mexico, which allowed individuals and groups to claim human rights 
under human rights instruments that were not yet explicitly included in the Mexican legal system. 
Second, the judiciary was obliged to harmonise constitutional dispositions with international 
treaties (conforming interpretation) and interpret the law for the benefit of a person (pro personae 
interpretation). Third, all authorities at federal, state, and municipal levels were obliged to 
act following human rights principles in any decision-making. Fourth, the introduction of the 
principle of full reparation in case of human rights violations. The state, therefore, recognises its 
responsibility for any action or omission that damages individual or collective human rights. These 
constitutional amendments had significant relevance to the recognition of self-determination of 
Cherán. 
3. Cherán: the uprising and beginning of self-determination
　　　Mexico is a federal republic composed of three government branches: the executive 
represented by the president, the legislative represented by the Chamber of Deputies as well as 
Senate of the Republic, and the judiciary embodied in the Supreme Court of Justice. The country 
has 32 sovereign states under the same three-branch principle. The federal states are divided into 
municipalities headed by a municipal president or mayor.
　　　Article 115 of the Federal Constitution establishes that the municipio  must be governed 
by a municipal council known in Spanish as ayuntamiento and is composed of a mayor, síndicos,  
and regidores  for three years. Síndicos  legally represent the municipality in court proceedings 
and monitor public finances, while regidores  are in charge of different commissions or public 
services. The number of síndicos  and regidores varies according to local needs and budget. The 
Constitution gives autonomy to the municipality in administration and financial management. 
The municipality provides the following public services: 1) drinking water, sewage system, and 
wastewater treatment; 2) public lighting; 3) cleaning, collection, allocation, treatment and final 
disposal of waste; 4) supply centres and markets; 5) cemeteries; 6) slaughterhouses; 7) building and 
maintenance of streets, parks and gardens; and 8) public security forces. 
　　　Cherán is a rural municipio  located in the Meseta (plateau) Purépecha in central Michoacán 
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that comprises the municipalities of Charapan, Chilchota, Nahuatzen, Nuevo Parangaricutiro, 
Paracho, Tancítaro, Taretan, Tingambato, Uruapan, and Ziracuaretiro. Today, these municipalities 
have mestizo and indigenous populations with a total population of 527,314 (CDI, 2015) within a 
geographic range of 8,370 km2 (Villavicencio, 2006). The main indigenous group in the zone is the 
Purépecha, whose earliest vestiges date back to 500 B.C. (Pollard, 2012).
　　　After the 2011 uprising, the community of Cherán rejected institutions such as political 
parties and the executive power represented by a mayor. On June 1, 2011, leaders and the people 
who joined the self-defence movement agreed to appoint their authorities under their usos y 
costumbres.  The concept of usos y costumbres can be translated into customs and practices whose 
root can be found in the Latin American constitutional tradition. Juan Martínez (2013) defines it as 
a “collection of practices, structures, and norms [that] constitute differenced modes of socio-political 
organization” (136). In Mexico, the concept refers to the practice of indigenous self-government 
with a particular normative system. Besides well-known civilizations such as the Aztec or Maya, 
or the Purépecha, it is difficult to determine what are the indigenous customs and traditions, and 
what are those mixed with the Spanish institutions. In this light, usos y costumbres are considered 
as a set of indigenous practices of self-government that have evolved through centuries (Gómez 
Peralta 2005). The principle behind usos y costumbres is that the State does not interfere with a 
system where local leaders are selected through a method which is different from the one under 
the electoral democracy (Xanthaki 2015). The constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador have expressly 
linked the concept of usos y costumbres  with the indigenous worldview of “Buen vivir/ Sumak 
kawsay” (fullness of life). According to a basic definition, sumak kawsay is a set of indigenous 
philosophical and political proposals for the economic, social, political, and environmental 
transformation (Cardoso-Ruiz, et al. 2016).
　　　Underpinned by usos y costumbres,  the community of Cherán’s decision was not to participate 
in the Michoacán elections for governor, mayors, and deputies scheduled on the November 13 
and not to allow the installation of polling stations (Urrutia, 2011). Instead of starting a violent 
movement, a group of local and external lawyers worked on a legal strategy to claim self-
determination. On August 26, 2011, the community submitted a self-determination request to the 
Electoral Institute of Michoacán (Instituto Electoral de Michoacán, IEM) signed by 1,942 persons. 
On September 9, the IEM declared its incompetence to hear and resolve the case. 
　　　Instead of exhausting all the legal remedies, the legal team promoted an action per saltum of 
“protection of the citizens’ political-electoral rights” to the Federal Electoral Court on September 
15. The action, this time signed by 2,312 people, was against the IEM’s refusal to hear and 
solve Cherán’s claim. Because of the significance of the trial which could have political and legal 
consequences for the state, the legal team probably expected that the federal court would intervene. 
Indeed, the Federal Electoral Court recognised the active legitimacy of the 2,312 plaintiffs 
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representing 18,141 inhabitants as indigenous peoples based on historical and anthropological 
records. On the November 2, the court delivered the decision in favour of Cherán (Durán Campos y 
otros vs. IEM 2011). 
　　　The obligation imposed by the Federal Constitution to apply international treaties (Article 
1) enabled the court to analyse constitutional self-determination (Article 2) in light of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
(C169), and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The 
decision’s core arguments are as follows:
　1. Cherán, as an indigenous community, has the right to self-determination (Article 1, ICCPR; 
and Article 1, ICESCR). This right must be exercised through an autonomy arrangement 
that maintains national unity (Article 2, Federal Constitution) through their structures and 
traditions. This right must not be contrary to domestic order and human rights principles 
(Article 8.2, C169; and Article 3, UNDRIP).
　2. Cherán’s awareness of its indigenous identity is the fundamental basis to assert self-
determination (Article 2, Federal Constitution). Rather than a quality, identity is a right to 
identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such. Therefore, indigenous peoples 
have the right to decide the composition of their political structures (Article 33, Sections 1 
and 2, UNDRIP; and Article 1, Section 2, C169). Thus, the existence and protection of their 
institutions and forms of self-governance are a crucial part of their indigenous identity.
　3. Citing scholarly literature, the court explained that indigenous self-determination encompasses 
four elements: a) self-affirmation, the capacity of indigenous peoples to declare themselves 
as existent entities; b) self-definition or self-enrollment, the collective and individual right to 
determine their membership by themselves; c) self-limitation, which implies the right to mark 
their territory; and d) self-disposition, the option of organising themselves in the political, 
social, economic, and cultural ways that best suits them.
　4. Self-determination operates through concrete means of autonomy, such as the autonomy to 
decide their organisation. It includes the freedom to apply their customary law mindful of 
human rights in general and women’s rights specifically; and the freedom to choose or appoint 
their authorities or representatives according to their traditional mechanisms (Articles 2 and 5, 
Federal Constitution; Articles 7 and 8, C169; Articles 4, 20, and 33, UNDRIP).
　　　It must be stressed that the case before the federal court was not for self-determination, 
but the rejection by the IEM to hear and decide on the issue of the right to self-determination. 
However, by applying the pro personae  interpretation (Article 1, Federal Constitution), the court 
solved the underlying claim by declaring the self-determination of Cherán. Furthermore, the court 
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went beyond the original case when it ordered the Congress of Michoacán to harmonise the local 
constitution with the federal one as well as the international treaties. At that time, there was no 
legislation regarding the indigenous peoples in Michoacán State. The court ordered the IEM to 
consult with the rest of Cherán inhabitants so that they would express their agreement to choose 
their leader or representatives according to their usos y costumbres.  The consultation had to 
follow the guidelines of the C169 and the UNDRIP. The court deemed that the resolution could be 
considered fulfilled only in that way.
　　　Cherán chose not to elect but appoint their representatives. When the community substituted 
the word “elect” for “appoint,” it marked a distance from an electoral democracy based on political 
parties and secret ballots. By appointing a local citizen for a public office, there is no competition 
between candidates. At least, in theory, electoral democracy is distinct because of the competition 
of political candidates. As Mandujano Estrada (2014) explained, according to the Purépecha 
worldview, when community members are appointed to perform a public function, they must 
provide a community service. In indigenous customary law, leadership roles must be accepted, 
and service must be provided for the benefit of the group. Hence, there is no competition between 
candidates because the citizens cannot refuse the appointment.
4. Counter-democracy vs Organised Distrust
　　　This section elaborates on the concepts counter-democracy and organised distrust. The 
concept of counter-democracy was coined by Rosanvallon (2012) as “a form of democracy that 
reinforces the usual electoral democracy as a buttress, a democracy of indirect powers disseminated 
throughout society, in other words, a durable democracy of distrust” (8). For him, democracy 
cannot be conceived without “organisation of distrust” while he denies the discourse of passive 
society. Instead of trust and democracy crisis, Rosanvallon suggests an evolution in the role of the 
citizenry based on surveillance. This oversight is expressed in three forms: vigilance, denunciation, 
and evaluation. Vigilance is the continuous monitoring of government action, an active social 
attentiveness scrutiny (Rosanvallon, 2012, 40). Denunciation is not only the identification of 
problems and failures of a specific system but also the additional veto power of citizens. Evaluation 
entails treating the people as judges that expect results from elected officials. The three modalities 
are linked to what Rosanvallon refers to as the “sovereignty of prevention” (21). Unlike the classic 
concept of sovereignty understood as the people’s will, the sovereignty of prevention involves 
negative sovereignty and consists of attempts to reverse a governmental decision considered 
harmful to the community. Therefore, the sovereignty of prevention is the right to resist power.
　　　Rosanvallon’s work has inspired different insights. Counter-democracy has the potential to 
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expand beyond national boundaries. There is a possibility of a transnational counter-democracy 
exerted by people around the world who use the internet as a public space to oversee local and 
national leaders worldwide. What makes such transnational convergence possible is the negative 
democracy that does not require complete consensus over a specific issue but an elementary 
agreement (Sagnières, 2012). Counter-democracy has an essential role in social movements 
and civil society because it is critical and dissident. While liberal democracy sees citizens as 
mere electors because of limited deliberative mechanisms, counter-democracy smoothens social 
engagement through a variant of critical trust (della Porta, 2012). Counter-democracy also means 
the subversion against the standardisation of democracy packages by enhancing a constructive 
distrust. The practice of negative democracy recognises that every political community is fragile 
and conflictive since its foundation (Straehle, 2013). 
　　　In regions such as Latin America where democracy has not grown solid roots, the concept of 
counter-democracy refers to a democracy in continued state of tension. Poverty, social inequality, 
and fragmented group agendas have weakened social cohesion. Exercising counter-democracy can 
develop a new social covenant through citizen monitoring (Woldenberg, 2013). Counter-democracy 
becomes resistance when collaboration and debate between citizens and government are not 
possible due to tensions and exclusions between different actors. Traditional political participation 
means interactions within limited channels, but counter-democracy offers a deconstruction of 
deliberative democracies and the creation of counter-governance (Dean, 2018). Global governance 
can benefit from counter-democratic practices carried out by civil society organisations that may 
influence but cannot intervene directly in the design of policies. This governance can be possible 
when local society organisations work with their international counterparts to act as watchdogs. 
Ensuring actual bottom-up surveillance which may give more legitimisation to transnational 
stakeholders is, therefore, essential (Kalm, et al., 2019).
　　　Other scholars have conceptualised counter-democracy as a watchdog activity or an inquisitive 
democracy. Rancière (2006) developed the idea of a negative democracy that questions the elites 
and power continually. Real democracy should not be monopolised through institutions, but it 
must run throughout the marginalised groups. Keane (2009) conceptualises “monitory democracy” 
as extra-institutional mechanisms of supervision of government that operates at different levels, 
scales, and means. Like Rosanvallon, Keane sees monitory democracy as a negative democracy in 
which citizens suspect power. Crouch (2004) introduces the concept of “post-democracy” in which 
elites manipulate the public debate through media. The televised debates between candidates have 
become showbusiness, while politicians hire marketing experts to discover the needs and desires 
of the electorate to such an extent that voters become consumers. In other words, elites have more 
power through a traditional representative democracy. The paradox is that there is an increasing 
suspicion on politicians and the demand for more regulation. The originality of Rosanvallon (2012) 
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lies in his historical analysis of political distrust demonstrating that it is not a modern phenomenon 
and it has contributed to forging democracy. In addition, he makes a clear distinction between 
political legitimacy that is declared by a juridical system or legal procedure and trust as an “invisible 
institution” (Rosanvallon, 2012, 107) Trust improves legitimacy with a “moral” attribute that 
makes the relationship between government and citizens smoother (della Porte, 2010).
　　　However, Rosanvallon seems to fail when he confines counter-democracy as a tool to 
complement electoral democracy. In his view, power comes mainly from those who are elected to 
public office, neglecting the role of other stakeholders. Thus, his concept of counter-democracy is 
somehow conservative in that representative democracy is the only one that can be challenged. 
Power does not necessarily come from top-down but also from horizontal relationships that 
negotiate privileges and suppressions. Thus, this paper prefers the term “organised distrust” to 
give greater flexibility, subversion, and action range than the original concept of counter-democracy. 
Although this distrust still is a part of negative democracy, it becomes dissident and therefore 
proactive when it is an essential element for the self-determination of a community.
　　　Using the concepts elaborated in this section, we now proceed to discuss how democracy 
operates in Cherán, an example of democracy sustained by the organised distrust.
5. Democracy in Cherán
　　　Once self-determination was recognised for Cherán, leaders had to rethink their identity 
narratives to keep the movement alive. Nevertheless, part of the community realised that 
narratives are not enough to strengthen the social cohesion and trust towards the new government 
based on collective decisions. Self-determination appears as an ongoing process. Cherán exercises 
its self-determination through an organised distrust or counter-democracy understood as a demand 
for continuous accountability of its governance structure.
　　　Cherán is territorially comprised of four barrios. In Purépecha language, a barrio  is called 
irénarhikua.  The neighbourhood assembly or irénarhikueri tángurikua is the highest authority 
of each barrio  whose residents are referred to as comuneros.  Every comunera and comunero is 
attached to one of the four barrios as a political affiliation based on their place of residence. Each 
barrio has two representatives called coordinador de barrio  (neighbourhood coordinator). The 
four barrios  are further subdivided into sections called fogatas (bonfires). The fogatas started as 
checkpoints and trenches across the town in the following days after the armed movement. Initially, 
the bonfires had the purpose of keeping people warm and cooking meals during the entrenchment. 
The fogatas transformed into a socialising space between neighbours of the same street or block. 
People continued with the bonfires in the street for around one year until they were converted 
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into a territorial subdivision. In theory, the fogatas have a coordinator who represents one of these 
subdivisions. The other authority is the Consejo Mayor or Council of Elders constituted by twelve 
persons known as K’eri  (plural, K’eris ). Three K’eris come from one of the four barrios that they 
represent.
　　　Each barrio  holds a neighbourhood assembly once a week, except barrio tercero  that 
meets twice a week. The main goal of the neighbourhood assemblies is to create open spaces 
for the proposal of ideas and actions regarding needs and the town’s affairs in general and the 
appointment of the comuneros.  
　　　Through the observation of neighbourhood assemblies, there were two themes which appeared 
as the basis of Cherán’s democracy: identity discourse and organised distrust. 
5.1 Identity discourse
　　　Neighbourhood assemblies work as a forum for the discussion of public affairs and are the 
space for enhancing the group identification. Coordinators of Fogatas and any citizen interested 
in participation make up the bulk of the audience. Questions and answers usually followed the 
appearance of local authorities before the people in the assemblies. In many cases, the citizens 
criticised the performance of their authorities while giving speeches that invoke Purépecha values 
and autonomy. Active participants in the assemblies, either consciously or unconsciously, assumed 
the role of leaders. These leaders had skills to articulate ideas, proposals, criticism, and collective 
identity discourses. They were aware of the court’s arguments in which indigenous identity played 
the central role to achieve self-determination. In general, these narratives came after questionings 
and criticisms against authorities. 
　　　In one of the assemblies of barrio segundo,  active participation of the people was evident 
as they questioned the content of a work plan presented by their authorities. Seven individuals 
asked questions and made comments. One man commented that they were expecting a work plan, 
but was instead presented with an inventory of goods that should have been done four or five 
months earlier. Another man who spoke four times in different instances questioned the capacity 
of the council to understand the meaning of the work plan because it was apparent that only an 
inventory was presented. The third man took the floor and said: “Fellows, remember that we are an 
autonomous town since 2011; it was hard to reach this point, and we cannot expect that someone 
from the outside will solve our problems. The best way to defend our self-determination is through 
the construction of a good governance structure. We must demonstrate why we gained autonomy to 
choose our authorities according to our traditions.” Two other men also referenced the autonomy of 
Cherán as a consequence of their assertion of indigenous identity.
　　　Even though the essence of such identity was never articulated, people used to talk about 
their traditions and values as something shared and understood by everyone. We found one 
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example during an assembly of barrio tercero.  The discussion was about the increasing addiction 
to drugs and alcohol among the youth. One of the participants suggested using the history of 
Cherán and other Purépecha towns along with their traditions to solve the most urgent problems 
of the community. The same participant was identified as one of the persons who adopted a role as 
a leader in his barrio due to his active interventions. The point is not if everyone understands the 
same when talking about identity, history, or traditions, but the repetition of self-identification as a 
group.
　　　The leaders’ discourse affects the perception of community members as expressed by one 
interviewee:
　　Of course, we are Mexicans—look at us! But also, we are Purépechas, and we are Cherani. 
Cherán is my land where all my family has lived; my roots are there. In the weekdays I work 
in my studio in Morelia, but as soon as the weekend comes, my wife and I immediately go back 
to Cherán. Well, my wife is from Sevina (a neighbouring town).
The identity is thus reproduced and reinforced.
　　　Since the federal court recognised Cherán’s self-determination based on their indigenous 
identity, the leaders—those who hold public office as well as active participants in the assemblies—
must keep the discourse of we, especially during the assemblies by demonstrating a level of passion 
and commitment. Therefore, their indigenous identity is frequently asserted as the bastion of self-
determination. As Callero (2010) discusses in a different context, identity might become a social 
capital.
5.2 Organised Distrust
　　　The institution of neighbourhood assemblies contradicts with the trust within the town. 
During the assembly, representatives of the government structure must respond to any question, 
claim, or request from the audience. Each barrio agrees to call a representative from the 
department or section in charge of public services (i.e. sewage, police, garbage collection). Then, the 
representatives must propose a solution or provide information regarding any problem identified by 
the citizens. The Keri’s, twelve leaders who form the highest collegial body, are not the exception. 
They must respond to hard questions and criticisms about public administration issues.
　　　The demand for accountability extends beyond the authorities and even includes the self-
criticism of Cherán as a community. Self-criticism is possible because of the backgrounds of the 
citizens who attend the asambleas.  They are diverse: from comuneros,  to different professionals 
such as lawyers, teachers, university professors, biologists, engineers, and the like. The discussions 
are usually rich, thanks to the different perspectives of the participants. Nonetheless, the active 
discussion does not equate to problem-solving. Due to the variety of perspectives and number of 
participants, in the end, it was difficult to grasp what the final solution was.
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　　　The asambleas de barrio was a vital resource to discover the importance of organised distrust. 
More precisely, there is an active watchdog practice among Cherán inhabitants that demands 
accountability from those who compose the local government and monitors the behaviour of other 
citizens. Distrust here is close to what Rosanvallon (2012) refers to as counter-democracy—an 
indirect distribution of power running across society through vigilance, accusation, and evaluation. 
The main feature of this political form is a manageable distrust wherein citizens watch, demand, 
and evaluate the elected public officials. The asambleas de barrios work not only as a forum to 
discuss the public affairs but also as a space to suspect the power within the municipio.
　　　The asambleas de barrio  is an example of a living democracy where the perception of efficacy 
is prioritised over the formality of institutions. Ideally, the asambleas  should be the place to 
make proposals. Its principal feature is to resist power. Cherán inhabitants could be likened to a 
panopticon that enables the vigilance and monitoring of any local person with public duties. Hence, 
the asambleas  is a valuable channel for residents because they have the perception of shared 
control, if not through proposals, at least by questioning power. Thus, sharing an identity does not 
necessarily translate into automatic social cohesion.
6. Conclusion
　　　Cherán’s democracy, through its usos y costumbres,  is far from perfect. The main advantage 
derived from Cheran’s self-determination is the perception of horizontal control, even though 
the efficacy of the public administration is difficult to measure. Therefore, rather than trust, 
organised distrust becomes the mechanism to cope with risks because it enhances the perception 
of shared power. Conventional wisdom dictates that when two parties trust each other, their future 
exchanges will be smooth because there is no need to verify their mutual intentions and capacities. 
The rationale behind it is the maximisation of benefits at lower costs and the reduction of risks 
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Ho & Weigelt, 2005; Lewicki & Polin, 2013; Uslaner, 2013; Luhmann, 
2017). 
　　　When citizens trust in their institutions and politicians, it is supposed to be a sign of healthy 
democracy (Hetherington, 1998). Nevertheless, if political leaders enjoy a high percentage of trust 
from their fellow citizens, there is little need to be transparent about their decisions. For this 
reason, check and balance mechanisms are crucial to prevent tyrannies and populist regimes based 
on extreme nationalist narratives (Krishnamurthy, 2015). The problem is that check and balance 
procedures require experts, usually lawyers or a person with a deep understanding of their political 
system. Here, organised distrust does not need elites to get the system’s gears moving, because any 
person embedded in the sociocultural context can do it. 
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　　　Organised distrust can take on a political form to prevent excessive power by government 
structures. Unlike the constitutional check and balance mechanisms, organised distrust seems 
more valuable and pragmatic as seen in Cherán. The results of pointing out corrupt activities or 
omissions in the exercise of authority are faster than the proposition of thoughtful solutions and 
long-term projects.
　　　Organised distrust also means that identity narratives are not enough to maintain social 
cohesion. Contrary to liberal democracy’s deliberative mechanisms, organised distrust does not 
require a great social pact with high social cohesion. The citizens need to feel that they are heard 
by their government rather than listening to the leaders’ identity discourses. While the efficiency 
of the public administration is not always evident, the perception of shared control through an 
organised distrust proves to be a valuable device.
　　　In times of distrust towards traditional societal institutions, the concept of elites carries 
a negative connotation. Elites are viewed with suspicion because there is a perception of group 
interests over the common ones. Moreover, the feeling of exclusion and populist discourses 
generates and exacerbates mass resentment. In the case of Cherán, it seems that the elites develop 
naturally, simply because there are people with capacities that others do not have. The replacement 
of one system does not imply the disappearance of elites. It means a substitution for others or its 
adaptation to the winds of change. 
　　　Although further studies are necessary particularly on the role of identity and self-
determination, our findings suggest that identity is a crucial device to sustain self-determination 
in Cherán. Identity is not only a process of self-categorisation and comparison between in-groups 
and out-groups but also a political and group survival device in the context of self-determination. 
The ways by which identity is built, developed, and reproduced might determine the success of the 
entire self-determination project.
　　　Several elements lead us to conclude that organised distrust is more suitable for societies or 
groups with a history of conflicts among its members like Cherán. Contrary to liberal democracy 
and its deliberative mechanisms, organised distrust does not require a great social pact. The 
problem is not the formation of elites but their greed for power and resources and their inability to 
listen to those in the periphery of power. The organised distrust acknowledges conflict, tension, and 
resistance within an imagined community. Rather than figuring out how to avoid tension, organised 
distrust tends to use tension as a resource.
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